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13.1  Introduction
in Spinoza’s rationalist framework, sense perception yields the lowest kind of cog-
nition. in his early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Spinoza talks about 
four kinds of perception, sense perception being characterized as follows:
there is the Perception we have from random experience, that is, from experience that is 
not determined by the intellect. But it has this name only because it comes to us by chance, 
and we have no other experiment that opposes it. So it remains with us unshaken. ( TdIE 
§ 19.)
the description we find in the Ethics runs similarly:
from what has been said above, it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal 
notions:
i. from singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in a way that 
is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect (see p29c); for that reason i have 
been accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from random experience[.] (2p40s2.)1
According to Spinoza, this kind of imaginative cognition is inadequate in its mu-
tilation, confusion and disorderliness (2p41). As is well known, the aim is to gain 
adequate knowledge, ultimately of the highest kind, or what Spinoza calls intuitive 
knowledge:
1 i use the following method in referring to the Ethics: a = axiom, c = corollary, d = definition (when 
not after a proposition number), d = demonstration (when after a proposition number), p = proposi-
tion, s = scholium. for instance, 1p8s2 refers to the second scholium of the eighth proposition in the 
first part of the Ethics. it should be noted that sense perception thus forms the first aspect of what 
Spinoza calls opinion or imagination. the other aspect is that of perceiving things “from signs, 
e.g., from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain 
ideas of them, which are like them, and through which we imagine the things (p18s)” (2p40s2).
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in addition to these two kinds of knowledge,2 there is (as i shall show in what follows) 
another, third kind, which we shall call intuitive knowledge. And this kind of knowing 
proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things. (2p40s2.)
the precise nature of this rather ambitious-sounding type of knowledge raises some 
traditionally thorny interpretative issues; but obviously, we are dealing with a kind 
of intellectual grasp of the eternal God-or-nature and of finite things as its modifi-
cations. this is one of the places in which Spinoza’s strong intellectualist tendencies 
come to the fore. A passage in his correspondence indicates that the fundamental 
philosophical truths can be apprehended by the intellect only: “[t]here are many 
things that can in no way be apprehended by the imagination but only by the intel-
lect, such as Substance, Eternity, and other things”. ( Ep12.) this kind of adequate 
cognition of things is perception in a very different sense than that which we acquire 
through our senses; but it is not without experiential character of its own, and one 
that is at least comparable to that of sense perception:
for the Mind feels those things that it conceives in understanding no less than those it has 
in the memory. for the eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the dem-
onstrations themselves. (5p23s.)
there is, in turn, a strong linkage between adequate knowledge and activity. As 
some of the final propositions of Spinoza’s masterpiece state, the more we under-
stand things adequately, the more perfect and active we are:
the more the Mind understands things by the second and third kind of knowledge, the less 
it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less it fears death. (5p38.)
the more perfection each thing has, the more it acts and the less it is acted on; and con-
versely, the more it acts, the more perfect it is. (5p40.)
for the eternal part of the Mind (by p23 and p29) is the intellect, through which alone we 
are said to act (by 3p3). But what we have shown to perish is the imagination (by p21), 
through which alone we are said to be acted on (by 3p3 and the gen. def. aff.). So (by p40), 
the intellect, however extensive it is, is more perfect than the imagination, q.e.d. (5p40c.)
Moreover, there can be little disagreement about whether ideas of sense perception 
are, for Spinoza, to be classed as passions or actions—the former is obviously the 
correct answer. All this, however, does not mean that sense perception would be, for 
Spinoza, completely passive. in what follows, i argue that there is in the Ethics an 
elaborate—and to my knowledge previously unacknowledged—line of reasoning 
according to which sense perception of finite things never fails to contain a definite 
active component. this argument for activity in sense perception consists of two 
main parts: first, that ideas we form through sense perception have something ad-
equate in them; second, that the adequate component is actively brought about. dis-
2 Apart from the first type of knowledge (imagination) and the third type of knowledge (intuitive 
knowledge), there is also the second type of knowledge (reason), which derives “from the fact that 
we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (see p38c, p39, p39c, and 
p40)”.
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cerning this line of thought connects to—and sheds some new light on—Spinoza’s 
general way of understanding ideas as entities involving activity.
13.2  Sense Perception and Epistemic Adequacy
We can begin tracking down the argument for activity in sense perception by con-
sidering a prima facie surprising claim concerning our epistemic capacities:
the human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence. (2p47.)
the proof of the proposition reads:
the human Mind has ideas (by p22) from which it perceives (by p23) itself, (by p19) its 
own Body, and (by p16c1 and p17) external bodies as actually existing. And so (by p45 and 
p46) it has an adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite essence, q.e.d. (2p47d.)
the contention is thus that any idea of any finite thing, e.g. of a material body, 
yields us adequate knowledge of the very essence of God.3 As the demonstration 
signals, this should be evident by 2p45 and p46. let us take the former first:
each idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, necessarily involves 
an eternal and infinite essence of God. (2p45.)
Surely, this is the key contention. But why should it hold? Spinoza argues:
the idea of a singular thing which actually exists necessarily involves both the essence 
of the thing and its existence (by p8c). But singular things (by 1p15) cannot be conceived 
without God—on the contrary, because (by p6) they have God for a cause insofar as he is 
considered under the attribute of which the things are modes, their ideas must involve the 
concept of their attribute (by 1a4), i.e. (by 1d6), must involve an eternal and infinite essence 
of God, q.e.d. (2p45d.)
Staying true to the style of his preference, Spinoza keeps the argument relatively 
brief; but it cannot be denied that, in fact, the demonstration connects to a consider-
able number of central Spinozistic tenets.
the demonstration begins by stating that ideas of actually existing things in-
volve the essence and existence of the things ideated—a contention interpretable 
as a rather unstartling point of departure: we know that there exist finite things and 
have at least some grasp of their nature. the reference to 1p15, the proposition that 
3 in a recent paper, Martin lin (2009, p. 266) articulates the surprising nature of this contention in 
the following way:
So every mind contains a spark of rationality insofar as it is endowed with an adequate idea 
of God’s eternal and infinite essence. this is a surprising thesis. According to a widespread 
picture, no one, not even the wisest or most virtuous, can have any idea of God’s essence 
in this life. only after death is such knowledge possible. But according to Spinoza, not 
only the wise and virtuous possess this idea, but so do the fool and the knave. indeed, so 
do rocks and insects!
for lin’s way of making Spinoza’s position more understandable, see note 9 below.
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proclaims immanent monism, moves us to deeper waters. Here Spinoza reminds us 
of the central feature of his philosophy: finite things are entities both ontologically 
and epistemically dependent on the only substance, God-or-nature. this, however, 
is only a basic contention; in moving from it to the desired conclusion, Spinoza 
relies on a number of more fine-grained features of his system, some of which are 
left implicit in the demonstration.
in Spinoza’s ontology of substances, attributes, and modes, finite things belong 
to the last category. Attributes, in turn, constitute the essence of substance and are 
causally efficacious, capable of producing their own modes. 2p6 connects to these 
contentions, and Spinoza invokes it to argue that each and every mode—falling un-
der a certain attribute as it does—is produced by its attribute (and not by any other 
attribute). Because effects are conceived through their causes (1a4), it follows that 
a mode must be conceived through the attribute by which it is brought about; and 
because attributes, as already noted, constitute the substance’s essence, it follows 
that by having an idea of a mode we cannot avoid having an idea of God’s essence, 
or of an attribute that constitutes that essence.4
Given Spinoza’s framework, the argument seems valid. But it may not be found 
immediately convincing, and i would suggest that we articulate Spinoza’s line of 
thought in the following way to make it appear more plausible and less complex. in 
Spinoza’s basic metaphysics, any finite entity (for instance, a material body such as 
a tree) is a way in which an essential attribute (for instance, extension) of the only 
substance is modified. now it is in fact quite understandable that no modification 
can be conceived without having a conception of the attribute it modifies, because 
for example a particular tree is, in the Spinozistic scheme of thing, the attribute 
of extension modified “treely”, or in a specific way that results in a tree. As every 
singular thing is a modification of substance under a certain attribute, no idea of a 
finite thing can be formed without forming, at the same time, an idea of a certain 
(essence-constituting) attribute.5 thus, each idea of a singular thing involves God’s 
essence. While this account does not rely on the causal relationship obtaining be-
tween attributes and modes,6 it shows, i think, that the proposition to be proven is, 
given Spinoza’s scheme of things, quite understandable and well secured.
4 the relationship of substances and attributes and the nature of “constitution” involved raise some 
very difficult questions. However, i think it can be said, roughly, that the concept of attribute and 
that of substance are so tightly intertwined that there is, at most, what is traditionally called a 
distinction of reason between the two; for more on this, see Koistinen (1991, pp. 18–24); Viljanen 
(2009).
5 in fact, i believe this is one of the major reasons for saying that finite things are precisely modes, 
not some other type of properties. for an informative account of the ontological status of modes in 
the thought of such predecessors of Spinoza as Suárez and descartes, see Glauser (2002).
6 Also eugene Marshall (2008, p. 67) explicates the argument of the demonstration in non-causal 
terms:
Whenever one forms an idea of any thing or event, one must form that idea under a certain 
attribute. in other words, the idea of thought in general is involved in one’s idea of some-
thing mental, while the idea of extension is involved in one’s idea of something bodily; one 
cannot consider a particular body without assuming the general idea of extension.
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All this, however, does not explain why an idea of an attribute (e.g. of extension) 
involved in our perception of finite things (e.g. of bodies) must be an adequate 
one. the subsequent proposition states that “[t]he knowledge of God’s eternal and 
infinite essence which each idea involves is adequate and perfect” (2p46), and its 
demonstration argues:
the demonstration of the preceding Proposition is universal, and whether the thing is con-
sidered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether of the whole or a part (by p45), will involve 
God’s eternal and infinite essence. So what gives knowledge of an eternal and infinite 
essence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole. And so (by 
p38) this knowledge will be adequate, q.e.d. (2p46d.)
the argument thus relies on 2p38, which reads:
those things which are common to all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, 
can only be conceived adequately. (2p38.)
let A be something which is common to all bodies, and which is equally in the part of each 
body and in the whole. i say that A can only be conceived adequately. for its idea (by p7c) 
will necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human Body and 
insofar as he has ideas of its affections, which (by p16, p25, and p27) involve in part both 
the nature of the human Body and that of external bodies. that is (by p12 and p13), this idea 
will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human Mind, or insofar 
as he has ideas that are in the human Mind. the Mind therefore (by p11c) necessarily per-
ceives A adequately, and does so both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives 
its own or any external body. nor can A be conceived in another way, q.e.d. (2p38d.)
Hence, the claim is that a feature common to all things of a given domain can only 
be perceived adequately; and as for instance extension and thought are, of course, 
something shared by all of their respective modes, we cannot conceive them in-
adequately. But it is perhaps not immediately clear why should this hold. How 
could the reasoning behind this be elucidated? i would suggest that it turns on the 
idea that certain features common to all things are uniform and not composed of 
parts—this is why they can be called “common” to begin with—and so any idea 
of them is as accurate and correct as the next one. i believe that descartes very 
informatively explicates this in the twelfth rule of his early Rules for the Direction 
of the Mind:
[S]ince we are concerned here with things only in so far as they are perceived by the intel-
lect, we term “simple” only those things which we know so clearly and distinctly that they 
cannot be divided by the mind into others which are more distinctly known. Shape, exten-
sion and motion, etc. are of this sort; all the rest we conceive to be in a sense composed out 
of these. (CSM i, 44, emphasis added.)
[t]hese simple natures are all self-evident and never contain any falsity. […] for it can 
happen that we think we are ignorant of things we really know, as for example when we 
suspect that they contain something else which eludes us, something beyond what we intuit 
or reach in our thinking, even though we are mistaken in thinking this. for this reason, it is 
evident that we are mistaken if we ever judge that we lack complete knowledge of any one 
of these simple natures. For if we have even the slightest grasp of it in our mind—which 
we surely must have, on the assumption that we are making a judgement about it—it must 
follow that we have complete knowledge of it. Otherwise it could not be said to be simple, 
but a composite made up of that which we perceive in it and that of which we judge we are 
ignorant. (CSM i, 45, emphasis added.)
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the thesis thus is that either one grasps something so simple and uniform as the 
attribute of extension in its entirety, i.e. adequately, or one does not grasp it at all. 
i think this is what underpins Spinoza argument for 2p38,7 and so he feels himself 
entitled to claim that common things are adequately conceived both insofar as God 
conceives a singular human body and insofar as he conceives the states of that body 
that are partly brought about by other bodies.8
the first part of the argument for activity in sense perception is thereby complete, 
and the claim that we have “adequate knowledge of God’s eternal and infinite es-
sence” (2p47) can be said to be on firm Spinozistic grounds. in fact, the discussion 
above has shown, i think, that it is not as striking a statement as one might at first 
blush be tempted to think.9
Before moving on in reconstructing the rest of the argument, it is instructive to take 
a quick look at the role and significance some notable commentators have considered 
2p47 (and the propositions leading to it) to have in Spinoza’s system. in a recent paper, 
diane Steinberg writes as follows:
the ideas of the attributes and what follows from them make up what Spinoza refers to as 
the “common notions” (2p38c, 2p40s, 5p12d, 5p28d). Spinoza also proves that we have 
adequate knowledge of God’s essence (2p45–p47); but because the attributes constitute 
God’s essence, this knowledge does not appear to involve anything beyond what is con-
tained in the most basic of the common notions. What is added by 2p45–p47 is that the 
most basic knowledge of what is common to all finite things is also knowledge of the divine 
essence. (this is a consequence of God’s immanent causality.)10
7 i would thus agree with Marshall (2008, p. 70) who, without invoking invoke the Cartesian line 
of thought, argues:
now, if something is conceptually simple, one cannot grasp it only in part, for it is not 
so composed. instead, one must grasp it completely, that is, adequately, or not at all. for 
example, self-evident notions often are said to display this characteristic of simplicity. And 
this seems to be exactly how Spinoza takes the idea of the attributes—self-evident truths 
of the highest simplicity.
8 in the demonstration, Spinoza refers to 2p7c, which states that “God’s power of thinking is equal 
to his actual power of acting. i.e., whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature follows 
objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection”. However, i find 
this almost puzzlingly uninformative, because from this it obviously follows that God conceives 
adequately everything pertaining to finite things, be it common or not. thus, 2p7c seems to be 
of little help in understanding why precisely common things can be only adequately conceived. i 
think that in 2p38d, Spinoza is relying on the line of thought concerning simplicity, as explicated 
above. it might be helpful to note that Spinoza’s common notions are quite unlike lockean general 
ideas: according to Spinoza, common notions are concretely in the things themselves, and there 
is no process of abstraction involved in acquiring them; for locke’s position, see especially EHU 
iii.3.
9 largely based on a line of interpretation concerning Spinoza’s theory of consciousness presented 
by don Garrett (2008), lin (2009, p. 266) gives the following alternative reason for thinking that 
2p47 is not, in the end, as surprising as it might first seem:
But Spinoza believes that in most minds, the power of this idea is very slight and, to the 
extent that it possesses any power at all, it is overwhelmed by the contrary force of various 
passions. So, although an adequate idea of the essence of God is possessed by all, most are 
only dimly conscious of it and it does little to determine their thought and action.
10 Steinberg (2009, p. 150).
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now Steinberg is right to point out that Spinoza’s argument for 2p47 relies on his 
understanding of God’s causality; but i would see 2p45–p47 as more important than 
she seems to do. 2p38 says that features common to all things (of a given attribute) 
can only be adequately cognized. But 2p47 does not tell us only this but also, and 
much more significantly, it informs us of how we can form adequate ideas of com-
mon features, and even of something as fundamental as the essence of God. this, 
in turn, is the basis of nothing less than the third kind of knowledge, as Spinoza 
himself tells us:
from this we see that God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to all. And since 
all things are in God and are conceived through God, it follows that we can deduce from 
this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, and so can form that third 
kind of knowledge of which we spoke in p40s2 and of whose excellence and utility we shall 
speak in Part V. (2p47s.)
it is by no means easy to see the nature of this deduction;11 but at least he has given 
grounds for us having a basis from which it could emerge—which is not a minor 
detail and obviously the reason why Spinoza presents the argument of 2p45–p47 in 
the first place.
13.3  From Adequacy to Activity
the second part of the argument consists of showing that from the thesis that sense 
perception always contains an adequate idea of an attribute it follows that while 
perceiving things we are inevitably active. Spinoza defines activity as follows:
i say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate 
cause, i.e. (by d1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can 
be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. (3d2.)
in other words, we are causally active when we are the complete, or total, or entire 
cause of an effect—in such a case, the effect can be conceived through our own na-
ture alone (recall that, according to 1a4, effects are conceived through their causes). 
now Spinoza holds that when we have an adequate (i.e. clear and distinct) idea of 
something, we must be the active cause of the idea:
our Mind does certain things [acts] and undergoes other things, viz. insofar as it has ade-
quate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it 
necessarily undergoes other things. (3p1.)
epistemic adequacy thus implies causal adequacy. But this surely raises the ques-
tion, why would our activity be the exclusive source of adequate ideas? Spinoza’s 
answer to this question turns on certain central features of his monism. to begin, we 
should keep firmly in mind the following basic truth about the relationship between 
God-or-nature’s mind and finite human minds:
11 See, however, Gueroult (1974, pp. 467–480) and Koistinen (forthcoming). for an interpretation 
according to which the third kind of knowledge concerns the relationship obtaining between finite 
individuals’ and God’s power, see Wilson (1996, pp. 122–123).
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from this it follows that the human Mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. therefore, 
when we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that 
God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the 
human Mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human Mind, has this or that 
idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the 
nature of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with 
the human Mind, then we say that the human Mind perceives the thing only partially, or 
inadequately. (2p11c.)
Here Spinoza teaches us that any human mind partakes in (and even, as 5p40s says, 
constitutes) God’s infinite intellect,12 and that whenever we are engaged in a per-
ceptual process, what happens is that it is actually God who ( qua us) perceives 
something. Moreover, all of God’s ideas are adequate; when an idea we have is not 
that (but inadequate), God’s idea is a compound of our idea and of another thing’s 
idea; when our idea is adequate, God’s idea is formed through our mind only.
Knowing this background helps in analyzing Spinoza’s somewhat complicated 
argument for 3p1, which reads:
in each human Mind some ideas are adequate, but others are mutilated and confused (by 
2p40s). But ideas that are adequate in someone’s Mind are adequate in God insofar as he 
constitutes the essence of that Mind [only] (by 2p11c). And those that are inadequate in 
the Mind are also adequate in God (by the same cor.), not insofar as he contains only the 
essence of that Mind, but insofar as he also contains in himself, at the same time, the Minds 
of other things. next, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (1p36), of 
which effect God is the adequate cause (see d1), not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar 
as he is considered to be affected by that given idea (see 2p9). But if God, insofar as he is 
affected by an idea that is adequate in someone’s Mind, is the cause of an effect, that same 
Mind is the effect’s adequate cause (by 2p11c). Therefore, our Mind (by d2), insofar as it 
has adequate ideas, necessarily does certain things [acts]. (3p1d, emphasis added.)
the first half of the argument cites 2p11c and presents the line of thought we just 
encountered. the final part of the demonstration reveals Spinoza’s reasons for hold-
ing that epistemic adequacy implies causal adequacy, i.e. activity: whenever we 
have an adequate idea of something, there is an adequate idea in God’s intellect that 
is formed through our mind alone; this, in turn, means that the idea in question is 
produced solely by us, i.e. that we are the complete or entire—in Spinoza’s idiom, 
adequate—cause of that idea. And to be the adequate cause of something is to be 
active.
So, to recapitulate, Spinoza takes the following route from (epistemic) adequacy 
to activity. first, when we have an adequate idea, God has that idea through our 
mind alone—no other minds are involved. Second, effects are conceived through 
their causes. And so, third, when there is an idea to be conceived through a certain 
finite mind alone, it is an effect of that mind alone—which means that the mind in 
question is the adequate cause of the idea and thus active. Whenever we have an 
adequate idea, we cannot help being active; were this not the case, God’s idea would 
not be formed through a single mind alone but through several minds, which would 
make the idea in question inadequate in those minds.
12 for more on this, see Koistinen (2009).
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the second part of the argument for the adequacy in sense perception is now 
complete. When connected to the first part, we can see the argument to be, to put 
it briefly, that in every idea formed through sense perception there is ingrained an 
adequate idea of an attribute, which idea cannot but result from the perceiver’s 
activity. there is thus a specific active component in each and every sense percep-
tion; not even the most mutilated and confused sense perception can fail to carry 
something lucid and unconfused within it. All this is nicely in keeping with—and, 
evidently, reveals some of the reasons underpinning—Spinoza’s way of defining 
ideas as being formed through mental activity:13
By idea i understand a concept [conceptum] of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is 
a thinking thing.
exp.: i say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate 
that the Mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind. 
(2d3.)
Whatever we may think about Spinoza’s terminological intuitions, the message is 
unequivocal: production of ideas involves a basic form activity. Moreover, nothing 
here suggests that this would not hold with regard to ideas of sense perception.
13.4  Sources of Adequacy
We have seen that Spinoza can argue that there is an active ingredient in any idea of 
sense perception. But the argument does not tell us how that ingredient gets there—
it does not reveal the fundamental source of our activity, and how it is possible that 
from that source stem certain specific aspects of our ideas. i believe that Spinoza’s 
answers to these questions can be roughly outlined as follows.
Many of the propositions cited above contain references to what operate as the 
centers of causal efficacy in Spinoza’s world. recall especially the emphasized 
parts in the following passages:
[W]hen we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that 
God, […] insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human Mind, […] has this or 
that idea[.] (2p11c, emphasis added.)
i say that we act […] when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can 
be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. (3d2, emphasis added.)
But ideas that are adequate in someone’s Mind are adequate in God insofar as he constitutes 
the essence of that Mind [only] (by 2p11c). And those that are inadequate in the Mind are 
also adequate in God (by the same cor.), not insofar as he contains only the essence of that 
Mind, but insofar as he also contains in himself, at the same time, the Minds of other things. 
(3p1d, emphasis added.)
13 See also 2p49s, where Spinoza famously states that ideas are not to be regarded “as mute pic-
tures on a panel”. for notable recent discussions that emphasize the active character of ideas, see 
della rocca (2003); Steinberg (2005).
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in the emphasized passages, Spinoza designates that precisely essences (or natures) 
play a crucial role in God having his adequate ideas. especially when Spinoza talks 
about the cases in which we have adequate ideas, God both constitutes the essence 
of that mind and is explained through it. one summarizing articulation of this posi-
tion runs as follows:
[W]hen we say that an idea in the human Mind follows from ideas that are adequate in it, 
we are saying nothing but that (by p11c) in the divine intellect there is an idea of which 
God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected with the ideas of 
a great many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human 
Mind. (2p40d.)
Moreover, 3d2 states that when we are active, it is our essences that are efficacious: 
then something “follows from our nature”.14 this is unsurprising given the claim 
of general nature that there is nothing “from whose nature some effect does not fol-
low” (1p36). Spinoza can thus be said to champion what i have dubbed the essen-
tialist model of causation;15 according to it, the causal efficacy we find in things is 
due to their essences. Moreover, also the passages from which i have reconstructed 
the argument for activity in sense perception have given us indications about the ul-
timate source of this essential causal activity: finite things take part in God’s infinite 
power.16 it can be said more precisely, i think, that God’s causal power comes to be 
modified according to finite things’ essences,17 which also explains why Spinoza so 
frequently mentions essences (or natures) when he designates the factors involved 
in the formation of ideas, be those ideas—in finite minds—adequate or not. the 
contention concerning the activity involved in sense perception is thus nicely in 
keeping with Spinoza’s overall view of finite things as intrinsically dynamic centers 
of causal activity, and explains an expression as the one we can find in the early 
Metaphysical Thoughts: “[i]t [the will] is a thought, i.e., a power of doing each one, 
of affirming and of denying”. ( CM ii.12.)
unfortunately, the fact that like all really existing things, ideas have power as 
their basis—that of affirming—informs us little about the particular nature, and the 
results, of the dynamism involved—that there is a specific actively produced ele-
ment in the content of our sense perception. now the discussion above has shown 
that our essential mental power results precisely in adequate ideas of attributes. 
Clearly, this requires that there are certain concepts—recall here the appearance of 
the notion of concept in the definition of idea (2d3)—that are “of our own making”, 
concepts the forming of which depends on our mind alone but which nevertheless 
are of such a nature that they truly apply to all the things of a given domain (e.g. 
14 the first half of 3d2 focuses on activity, the latter half on passivity—and, interestingly, makes 
clear that essences are also involved in cases of passivity: “i say that we are acted on [pati] when 
something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial 
cause”. for more on this, see Viljanen (2011, Chap. 6).
15 See Viljanen (2008).
16 See especially 4p4, 4p4d.
17 for a detailed argument for and discussion of this, see Viljanen (2011, Chap. 3).
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thought or extension).18 Here Spinoza seems to be in agreement with descartes of 
the fifth Meditation, who argues that
i distinctly imagine the extension of the quantity (or rather of the thing which is quanti-
fied) in length, breadth and depth. […] not only are all these things very well known and 
transparent to me when regarded in this general way, but in addition there are countless par-
ticular features regarding shape, number, motion and so on, which i perceive when i give 
them my attention. And the truth of these matters is so open and so much in harmony with 
my nature, that on first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something 
new as remembering what I knew before; or it seems like noticing for the first time things 
which were long present within me although I had never turned my mental gaze on them 
before. (CSM ii, 44, emphasis added.)
thus, we are endogenously endowed with the concept of extension, whether or not 
we realize this when we perceive bodies. i believe it can be said that, for descartes, 
sense perception awakens the innate concepts and prompts them into operation. 
this, in turn, as raffaella de rosa has recently argued, structures our sense expe-
rience of external objects.19 Moreover, even though sensory perception is on the 
whole passive, there still seems to be a role to play for an active intellectual element. 
While discussing descartes’s example of the piece of wax, de rosa contends: “i 
take descartes to be saying here that the distinct (and intellectual) perception of 
the wax as a body having certain categorial features is latently contained (and 
actively employed) in the confused sensory perception of the piece of wax”.20 Spi-
noza seems to agree about this basic point in his doctrine of the formation of certain 
18 in a similar vein, Marshall (2008, p. 83) holds:
Say i see a hockey puck before me. in forming the sensory idea of this puck, i necessarily 
form certain common notions of extension. for example, implicit in my idea of the puck 
is the idea that it must be either at motion or at rest. further, in order to form such ideas, i 
must presuppose the idea of extension itself. these ideas, Spinoza says, are adequate ideas, 
and my mind is their adequate cause. therefore, though these common notions come to my 
mind when i see the puck, they are not caused by the puck and i do not learn them from 
the sensation. instead, they are a result of my mental activity, wholly caused by the mind, 
though triggered by the sensory experience. these common notions are present in my mind, 
which acts to form them whenever i have a sensation of a body.
19 de rosa (2010, esp. pp. 125, 127, 129, 131).
20 ibid., p. 128. later, when discussing Meditation Six, de rosa (2010, p. 132 n. 35) notes that “the 
overall passive character of sensory perception may not rule out an active role of the mind”. nicolas 
Malebranche’s doctrine of “vision in God” offers another interesting, albeit very different, Carte-
sian point of comparison. Malebranche endorses the Cartesian view that extension is intellectual in 
nature—something forming the concept of which does not require any input from the senses. in its 
eternity, immutability, necessity, infinity, and universality, this intellectual idea of extension cannot 
reside in finite minds but in God. So despite the fact that Malebranche’s “supernaturalism” so deci-
sively differs from Spinoza’s naturalist monism, there is a close linkage between extension and God 
for Malebranche as well. Moreover, in his later works Malebranche discusses causality pertaining 
to this idea, understanding it in a way opposite to Spinoza: for the latter, the human mind is of its 
own capable of producing the idea of extension, whereas for the former we seem to be completely 
causally inefficacious receivers of the intellectual idea of extension. for a very instructive account 
of Malebranche’s doctrine, see Schmaltz (2000, esp. pp. 74, 77, 79–81). for Malebranche’s reduc-
tive account of the faculty of understanding, see Schmid (forthcoming).
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basic concepts: there is an adequate idea—the active source of which we ourselves 
are—of the attribute of extension in every sense perception. i would suggest more 
precisely that, for Spinoza, we can always, by our own power, affirm the idea of ex-
tension (nothing external is needed to prompt us to do this); but we are determined 
to different specific ways of doing this. When i think about how a circle rotating 
around its diameter creates a sphere,21 i am having a thoroughly adequate idea (i.e. 
an idea that is adequate not with regard to extension only but also with regard to the 
way in which extension is modified); but when i see a table, i am having an inad-
equate idea, not of extension itself, but of the way in which it is modified.
We are still left with the question, why is the adequate idea of extension with which 
we are endowed not immediately transparent to us? Here i find helpful the tool anal-
ogy of the early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect to which r.J. delahunty 
draws attention. to adequately conceive of things through their essences or proximate 
causes ( TdIE § 19), we must use the intrinsic power of our intellect to make intellec-
tual tools with which we can attain knowledge of the true nature of things, just as the 
humankind has been able to construct tools with natural human abilities, more refined 
tools with those tools, and finally is able to accomplish many things with little effort 
( TdIE § 31). As delahunty notes,22 this suggests that the primary truths are discovered 
only with difficult labour. it seems that idea of extension is in all of us to be found, but 
not without considerable effort and philosophical reflection.23
13.5  Conclusion
to conclude, i would like to make some remarks concerning causality, passivity, 
and cognition which may help in clarifying our intuitions concerning activity in-
volved in sense perception. it should be noted that passivity does not equal causal 
inefficacy: patients do not have to be causally inactive. in accordance with this, 
causal inefficacy is not a traditional mark of patiency in a causal occurrence that 
involves (at least) two individuals: instead, being the bearer of the effect, i.e. the 
thing in which the produced effect or property inheres, is such a mark. this was 
so already for Aristotle, and early modern thinkers show considerable sympathy 
towards this tenet. to take one influential example, Hobbes writes as follows:
A Body is said to work upon or act, that is to say, do something to another body, when it 
either generates or destroys some accident in it: and the body in which an accident is gener-
ated or destroyed is said to suffer, that is, to have something done to it by another body; 
as when one body by putting forwards another body generates motion in it, it is called the 
AGent; and the body in which motion is so generated, is called the PAtient; so fire that 
warms the hand is the agent, and the hand, which is warmed, is the patient. That accident, 
21 See TdIE § 72.
22 delahunty (1985, pp. 23–24).
23 Marshall (2008, p. 67 n. 42) elaborates this type of approach nicely as follows: “this is not to 
say that we are consciously aware of the idea of extension when we consider a body, though this 
idea must be implicit, Spinoza believes. only through analysis of our concepts and similar cogni-
tive labor are these ideas made explicit”.
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which is generated in the patient, is called the EFFECT. ( Dco ii.9.1, emphases added, 
original emphases omitted.)
in his Passions of the Soul,24 descartes proceeds along the same lines; and in defin-
ing passivity, Spinoza shows signs of following the lead of his predecessors, for he 
claims that we are passive “when something happens in us […] of which we are 
only a partial cause” (3d2, emphasis added).25
As a matter of fact, it is quite difficult to regard patients as completely causally 
impotent. this applies especially to any instance of sense perception: how could the 
perceiver not have at least some effect on what kind of idea results from sense percep-
tion? it seems very plausible to hold that we are never entirely inefficacious while per-
ceiving through our senses. it thus seems that the really interesting question to ask is, 
not whether we are being causally efficacious while being passive, but what is it that 
we spontaneously bring to the table when we are in cognitive contact with the external 
world. And so we should appreciate the fact that there is in Spinoza’s system a line 
of thought that not only argues—on the basis of substance monism and other central 
commitments—that sense perception involves activity, but also designates more pre-
cisely what is being actively produced, and how. All of our ideas of sense perception, 
however mutilated and confused they may be, are endowed with an unconfused con-
cept brought about the very power that makes us, as mental existents, what we are.26
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